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The answer is no. It is an easy answer to give, because it is not mine. In fact, the question ‘Shall I 
apologize translation?’ is not mine either, hence the quotation marks framing it.   
The question is John Florio’s, ‘resolute John Florio’ as this most self conscious of Renaissance 
translators used to sign his name. ‘Shall I apologize translation?’ is the opening sentence of Florio’s 
address ‘To the Courteous Reader’ with which he prefaced his two volume translation into English of 
the essays of Michel de Montaigne. The book was entered in the Stationers’ Register in London in 
1600, but not published until 1603. It became one of the most influential translations of the age. 
Shakespeare drew on Florio’s version of Montaigne’s celebrated essay on cannibals for The Tempest. 
More about Florio and his Montaigne in a moment. Let me first indicate how he handles his 
own question: ‘Shall I apologize translation?’. He does not actually answer it with a straight ‘no’. 
Florio would never use one word when half a dozen or more would do. Instead of a simple negation he 
presents us with a whole list of possible objections to the noble task of translation, only to nip each 
objection in the bud with such speed and such ferocious wit that the objections look petty and crude. 
Here is a taste of how Florio overpowers the opposition: 
 
Shall I apologize translation? Why but some hold (as for their freehold) that such conversion is 
the subversion of universities.  God hold with them, and withhold them from impeach or 
impair. It were an ill turn, the turning of books should be the overturning of libraries. Yea but 
my old friend Nolano [i.e. Giordano Bruno] told me, and taught publicly, that from translation 
all science had its offspring. ... 
The Greeks drew their baptizing water from the conduit pipes of the Egyptians, and they from 
the well springs of the Hebrews or Chaldees. And can the well springs be so sweet and deep; 
and will the well drawn water be so sour and smell? ... 
Why but the vulgar should not know all. No, they cannot for all this; nor even scholars for 
much more: I would, both could and knew much more than either does or can. Why but all 
would not be known of all. No, nor can; much more we know not than we know; all know 
something, none know all. Would all know all? They must break ere they be so big. 
(Montaigne, 1969:n.p.) 
 
He carries on in this vein for several more pages. The joyous wordplay and the rhetorical flourishes are 
hard to miss. My main reason for choosing Florio’s opening sentence as my title, and for quoting the 
passage above, is that I want to explore some of the implications of Florio’s obvious delight in 
exuberant wit and verbal ostentation. I also have a further reason, which will become clear as we go 
along. 
First, however, a word about John Florio himself. His father, Michael Angelo Florio, left his 
native Italy after becoming a Protestant. Giovanni, or John, Florio, born in 1553, grew up in Oxford 
and on the Continent, frequented aristocratic circles in London, found himself in the service of the 
French Ambassador for a time, acted as Italian tutor to Queen Anne, compiled an Italian English 
dictionary, translated from both Italian and French into English, and died of the plague in 1625. We 
possess an excellent modern biography of him by Frances Yates (1934). 
 John Florio was perfectly conscious, and inordinately proud, of his linguistic skills. His first 
book, appropriately called First fruites and published in 1578, contains a miscellaneous collection of 
poems, dialogues and other such pieces. One dialogue shows how ill mannered the English are towards 
strangers, laments their lack of knowledge of foreign tongues (‘When I arrived first in London, I could 
not speak English, and I met above five hundred persons, afore I could find one that could tell me in 
Italian, or French, where the Post dwelt’) and proposes the death penalty for parents who fail to teach 
their children more than one language (‘I would there were such a Law, that if one should bring up his 
children without teaching them something, and especially to read, write and speak diverse languages,  
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that he should be beheaded’; Matthiessen 1931:112). 
Florio, clearly, delighted in robust opinions every bit as much as he enjoyed languages, words, 
style, wit and rhetoric. Indeed his translation of Montaigne is remarkable for the way it consistently 
elaborates, expands, dramatizes, rewrites and boldly overwrites Montaigne’s own measured, 
speculative and often angular style. Florio’s stylistic idiolect infects his translation. Where Montaigne 
gives rather sparing descriptions, Florio freely adds intensifiers. Let me quote a couple of typical 
instances taken from a long list. In each case I have italicised Florio’s additions. Where Montaigne 
speaks of  ‘l’autorité de son visage & la fierté de ses paroles’ [‘the authority of his countenance and 
fierceness of his words’], Florio has: ‘the mind-quelling authority of his countenance and awe-moving 
fierceness of his words’. For Montaigne’s ‘Les dix mille Grecs, en leur longue et fameuse retraite’ 
[‘The ten thousand Greeks in their long and famous retreat’], Florio gives: ‘The ten thousand 
Graecians in their long-lingering and far-famous retreat’. Montaigne’s ‘tels fatras de livres’ [‘such 
trash of books’] becomes ‘such idle time consuming, and wit-besotting trash of books’ (Matthiessen 
1931:122; Yates 1934: 233, 235). 
Montaigne is known to have preferred a style that was, as he put it, ‘simple and direct, ... far 
removed from affectation and artifice’ (‘Le parler que j’ayme, c’est un parler simple et naif ... esloigné 
d’affectation et d’artifice’; Yates 1934: 228). Florio’s manner is the exact opposite. It strains after 
rhetorical effect at every opportunity, and transforms Montaigne’s style in the process   so much so that 
Frances Yates says of Florio that ‘[h]e made, in fact, such a bad translation that it is nearly an original 
work’ (1934: 228). She condemns him for being  
 
... the least self effacing of translators ... standing fussily at the great man’s side, not behind 
him, ‘improving’ his style and not infrequently punctuating the argument with perfectly 
audible asides (1934: 234). 
 
Of course, most of Florio’s attempts to inject rhetoric into Montaigne’s style are ‘audible asides’ only 
if we put the French original alongside the English version. Readers perusing nothing but the English 
text will not be able to spot Florio’s additions. 
Every now and then the translator’s presence does make itself felt in the translation. Among 
these asides are innocuous interventions intended for the benefit of the English reader, as when Florio 
expands a reference to ‘le Louvre’ into the more explanatory ‘the Louvre, the palace of our Kings’ 
(Matthiessen 1931: 135). In this instance the translator’s discursive presence is detectable in the 
English text through the sheer redundancy of the information, an oddity which leaves the reader 
wondering who is actually speaking here. Would Montaigne, writing towards the end of the sixteenth 
century, have needed to explain to his readers in France that the Louvre, which was built only a few 
decades earlier, in the 1550s, was the palace of ‘our Kings’? 
A similar case occurs in a passage where Montaigne says that just as we cannot understand the 
animals, ‘aussi ne faisons nous les Basques et les Troglodytes’ [‘neither do we understand Basques and 
Troglodytes’], which Florio renders as: ‘no more do we the Cornish, the Welsh or Irish’ (Matthiessen 
1931: 154; Yates 1934: 236 7). Here we can wonder if the inclusive ‘we’ still refers to Montaigne and 
his French readers, as it does in most other instances in the essays; for English readers, the ‘we’ here 
comes to include them, but this is out of key with the subject position created in the rest of 
Montaigne’s work, in which a Frenchman speaks to French readers. 
Both examples are ‘audible asides’: we can hear the translator’s voice alongside the author’s. 
There is also a much more insidious and more ominous kind of intervention, not an ‘audible aside’ at 
all but a shift detectable only if we go back to compare the French with the English. In speaking of the 
controversial fifteenth century English Bible translator John Wycliffe, Montaigne at one point refers to 
‘les erreurs de Wyclef’ [‘Wycliffe’s errors’]; in Florio’s version however we read of ‘Wickliff’s 
opinions’ (Matthiessen 1931: 139; Yates 1934: 234). In transforming the source text’s judgmental 
reference to ‘errors’ into neutral ‘opinions,’ Florio is expressing a deliberate view, and one that differs 
significantly from Montaigne’s. The matter is of some gravity, not only because of the nature of the 
disagreement, religious beliefs deemed heretical in one case and unobjectionable in the other, but also  
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because, unless we are in a position to consult the French text and double check the translation (and 
therefore have no need of a translation in the first place!), we cannot detect the gap that Florio opens 
up here between Montaigne and himself.  
We had perhaps assumed that the translation, despite its stylistic bravado, remained ‘faithful’ 
to the substance of the original text. Our trust turns out to be misplaced. Florio is here caught being 
wilfully disloyal to his author and pursuing an agenda of his own. The gap between the original and its 
translation is real, insidious and significant, and has ethical and ideological dimensions. It is not really 
a matter of rhetoric or style, of expressive means or idiolect. Rather, it is a matter of voice and value, of 
a speaking subject positioning itself in relation to, and at a critical distance from, even in direct 
opposition to the source text. 
The question that interests me here is what happens when translators, or interpreters for that 
matter, consciously exploit this gap. What is the nature of the interstice between original and 
translation, and under what circumstances can that margin be prised open? At this point I should like to 
bring in Sherlock Holmes. But before I do that, I need a brief digression to Plato. By switching from 
Florio to Plato and then to Sherlock Holmes, we are guaranteed diversity. We can worry later about 
how to piece it all together again. 
In The Republic, Book 3, Chapter 6, Plato discusses two different ways of presenting a story. 
He distinguishes between ‘pure narration’ and ‘a narrative that is effected through imitation’;  for 
‘narration’ he uses the term ‘diegesis’, while ‘imitation’ is also called ‘mimesis’ (1994: 224 31). The 
exposition takes the form of a dialogue. As the interlocutor does not quite grasp the distinction between 
diegesis and mimesis, the speaker provides a fuller account. In ‘pure’ or ‘diegetic’ narration, he 
explains, ‘the poet himself is the speaker and does not even attempt to suggest to us that anyone but 
himself is speaking’ (1994: 227). In ‘mimetic narration’, on the other hand, ‘he delivers a speech as if 
he were someone else, ... assimilating his diction as far as possible to that of the person whom he 
announces as about to speak’ (ibid.). When, in a narrative, a character’s words have to be reported, 
‘mimetic’ narration will use direct speech, quoting the character verbatim, as it were; ‘diegetic’ 
narration employs indirect discourse, in which we continually hear the poet’s own voice.  
Plato’s interlocutor eventually gets the point, and concludes correctly that ‘diegetic’ narration 
is what we have in narrative poems, and ‘mimetic’ narration is what happens in plays. Actors enact the 
actions and speak the words of the characters as if those characters were real people whose words the 
actors borrow; the actors’ speaking imitates the words of the characters. 
However when Plato says that the poet ‘assimilates his diction as far as possible to that of the 
person whom he announces as about to speak’, he is admitting at the same time that there will always 
remain a margin between the two, however small. For the English ‘as far as possible’ Plato’s Greek 
text has o τι  άλιστα (‘ho ti málista’): ‘to the greatest extent, far and away, mostly’   and therefore not 
quite wholly. 
If this is the case, if mimetic speaking still leaves a differential margin, an interstice between 
itself and the speech being imitated, what happens if we think of translators as mimicking their 
author’s words, like actors, assimilating their own words ‘as far as possible’ to their authors’ words, 
but always leaving a gap between the two   and the gap is not one of language but of voice, of a 
speaking subject? And what if translators and interpreters set out to exploit this gap? Let us look at a 
striking, if fictional, instance.  
It occurs in the Sherlock Holmes story ‘The Greek Interpreter,’ by Arthur Conan Doyle. The 
plot of this story runs as follows. Melas, a Greek interpreter living in London, tells Sherlock Holmes 
how  two days ago he was kidnapped, blindfolded and taken to a house on the outskirts of the city. 
There two Englishmen forced him to interpret for them. They produced someone they were holding 
prisoner, a Greek man who did not speak a word of English. The Englishmen did not understand 
Greek. Melas had to interpret between the two parties. At the end of the session he was taken away and 
set free. Later on in the story it becomes clear that the prisoner, named Kratides, was the brother of a 
Greek girl whom one of the English villains had carried off and wanted to marry for her money. 
Kratides, the trustee of his sister’s fortune, had inadvertently fallen into the villains’ hands. He refused 
to sign his sister’s money over to them, and to compel him they were starving him to death. Despite  
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Sherlock Holmes’ best efforts the story ends with Kratides dead and the villains fleeing abroad, taking 
the girl with them. Poetic justice is done when some months later a report arrives which tells of the two 
villains killing each other after a quarrel, although Holmes prefers to believe that the girl probably 
killed both her captors. 
The interpretation scene in the story is most peculiar. Melas, interpreting under duress, stands 
between the English criminals and the Greek prisoner. However, he quickly realizes that, since the 
villains do not understand Greek, they cannot check on his words in that language. So he starts playing 
a dangerous game, tagging questions of his own to the translated words he addresses to the prisoner, 
eventually engaging in a private monolingual conversation with him, entirely in the margin of the 
bilingual spoken and written exchange. This allows him to collect vital information without the 
English kidnappers being aware of it. As Melas recounts it to Sherlock Holmes afterwards, the 
conversation ran like this:  
 
[Melas:] ‘You can do no good by this obstinacy. Who are you?’ 
[Kratides:] ‘I care not. I am a stranger in London.’ 
‘Your fate will be on your own head. How long have you been here?’ 
‘Let it be so. Three weeks.’  
‘The property can never be yours. What ails you?’ 
‘It shall not go to villains. They are starving me.’ 
‘You shall go free if you sign. What house is this?’ 
‘I will never sign. I do not know.’ 
‘You are not doing her any service. What is your name?’ 
‘Let me hear her say so. Kratides.’ 
‘You shall see her if you sign. Where are you from?’ 
'Then I shall never see her. Athens.’ (Conan Doyle 1951: 316) 
 
The italicized words are exchanged between the two Greek speakers only and remain intelligible only 
to them. The first part of every line, in roman font, takes on bilingual form (even though we read all 
this in English, as Melas relates it to Holmes) and represents the exchange, as mediated by Melas, 
between the Greek prisoner and the Englishmen.  
It will be clear that, from an ethical point of view, Melas is flouting all the deontic principles of 
the interpreting profession. Like John Florio deliberately covering up Montaigne’s qualification of 
Wycliffe as a heretic, Melas here pursues his own private agenda, which runs counter to that of his 
employers. He abuses his linguistic monopoly to gain information that is of benefit to himself   except, 
of course, that in the circumstances he is perfectly justified in doing so because his employers are 
criminals and Melas, having been taken there against his will, is attempting to assist an innocent fellow 
prisoner. 
The interpretation scene in Conan Doyle’s ‘The Greek Interpreter’ is of interest because it 
raises the issue of the interpreter’s ideological and personal loyalty, and of ways of controlling 
interpreters, especially when they may be in a position to pursue their own agenda and insert their own 
divergent subject positions into their supposedly  ‘mimetic’ discourse. The step from the fictional 
Sherlock Holmes story to historical examples is readily made. Let us briefly review some well known 
instances, more or less at random. In each case we will see it is the interpreter’s loyalty which is at 
stake, and the need for the powers that be to assure themselves of that loyalty. 
Christopher Columbus lands on the Caribbean island of Guanahaní on 12 October 1492. 
Barely six weeks later, when he is exploring other islands in the area and has to rely on native 
interpreters he has taken from Guanahaní, he writes in his diary (or the modern reconstruction of it, as 
the original is lost): 
 
I do not know the language; the people do not understand me, nor I them, nor any of my 
company. I often misunderstand what these Indians I have on board tell me, and I do not trust 
them, for they have tried repeatedly to escape. But now, God willing, I shall see whatever I  
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can, understanding and learning gradually, and I shall have all the language taught to one of 
my people. (27 November 1492; Cummins 1992: 84) 
 
And again, ten days later, as the interpreters grow increasingly restless in their desire to return to their 
own island: 
 
The Indians I have brought with me from the small islands are so eager to return home that I 
think I shall have to take them back when we leave here. They now distrust me so much for not 
making for their homeland that I have no faith in what they tell me; I cannot understand them 
clearly, nor they me... (6 December 1492, Cummins 1992: 89) 
 
In the end, as we know, Columbus left behind a group of his own men when he returned to Spain to 
report on his discovery. 
A similar case occurred a few years later in Brazil. After Vasco da Gama’s return from India, a 
second Portuguese fleet was sent out under Pedro Alvares Cabral in 1500. Sailing south along the 
African coast they followed a more westerly course and stumbled on the Brazilian coastline. We have 
an account of their brief stay in Brazil in a letter to the Portuguese king written by Pedro Vaz de 
Caminha. At one point the Portuguese are deliberating whether to take by force a couple of natives and 
ship them back to Portugal to have them learn Portuguese, or instead leave behind some of their own 
men   who happened to be convicts. They agree 
 
… that it was not necessary to take men by force, since it was the general custom that those 
taken away by force to another place said that everything about which they were asked was 
there; and that these two convicts whom we should leave would give far better information 
about the land than would be given by those carried away by us ... (Parry 1979: 89) 
 
The case of La Malinche, or Doña Marina, or Malintzin, the woman who became Hernán Cortés’ 
mistress and interpreter during the Spanish conquest of Mexico in 1519 21, is too well known to 
require much comment.  Although La Malinche was Aztec by birth, she appears to have been given 
away, or sold, to the Maya, and may have been passed on several more times before being presented, 
along with another twenty slaves, to Cortés. She learned Spanish, became Cortés’ mistress and 
transferred her loyalty to the Spanish invaders. She played a crucial role in passing on information to 
Cortés at critical moments, for example during the events that led to the massacre at Cholula, when she 
apparently discovered a conspiracy against the Spaniards, informed Cortés of the danger and allowed 
the Spanish army to strike first (there are conflicting accounts of the events); and again during the final 
hours of the last Aztec emperor, Cuauhtémoc, who was also accused of conspiring against his Spanish 
captors and summarily hanged. Small wonder that the Aztec chronicles, or those that have survived the 
systematic attempts by the Spanish victors to destroy them, often speak of her not as Malintzin but as 
Malin, leaving out the honorific suffix in an expression of contempt; in Mexican folklore La Malinche 
is reviled as a whore and a traitor to this day (Delisle & Woodsworth 1992: 260ff; Karttunen 1994; 
Van Zantwijk 1992). 
Throughout the European discovery of America the reliability of interpreters remained a major 
concern. It is not primarily a matter of linguistic competence, but of political loyalty and 
trustworthiness, of whose side the interpreter is on and whose interests he or she ultimately serves. 
Studying the history of these early contacts and the role of interpreters in them makes it abundantly 
clear that interpreters, far from being neutral, are involved   personally, economically, socially and 
politically   in the transactions they help to shape. The fewer interpreters there are, the harder it is to 
supervise their work and the more they are in a position to exploit, if they so wish, their unique access 
to information reaching them form both sides of the linguistic divide. As soon as their employers 
become aware of this, they also realize the need to impose tight controls on interpreters or assure 
themselves of their intermediaries’ loyalty by other means.  
On his first voyage to Canada, in 1534, the French explorer Jacques Cartier abducted two  
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Iroquois natives, brought them to France and later used them as interpreters. Having found however 
that he could trust them only up to a point and that they were prepared to betray him if the interests of 
their own people were threatened, he eventually set up a different system, sending young Frenchmen to 
live among the natives for a time to learn the language (Delisle 1993; Delisle & Woodsworth 1995: 
256ff.). Ethnic belonging served to secure loyalty and therefore trustworthiness. 
 In November 1556, in the port of Honfleur in Normandy, the Frenchman Jean de Léry, a 
Calvinist minister, boarded one of three ships bound for Brazil to set up a colony and establish a 
mission there. Among the three hundred or so passengers, Léry tells us in his History of a Voyage to 
the Land of Brazil, were ‘ten young boys, whom we took along to learn the language of the savages’ 
(Léry 1990: 7). Although  Léry does not subsequently say any more about them, the plan must have 
been to train them as interpreters. Because the boys were presumably French and the circumstances of 
their learning the language of the Tupinamba would be closely monitored, their loyalty could be 
trusted. 
A very similar operation, on a larger and more official scale, was set in motion in Paris a 
hundred years later. On 18 November 1669 the French Council of State issued a decree ordering the 
establishment of a training institute for interpreters between French and Turkish, to facilitate trade and 
diplomatic links between France and the Ottoman empire. The text of the decree, signed by Louis 
XIV’s minister Jean Baptiste Colbert, stipulates that the interpreters, who were to be trained from the 
age of nine or ten (and would become known as ‘language children’), had to be French nationals and 
would be in the care of French Capuchin friars in Constantinople (modern day Istanbul) and Smyrna, 
•so that in future we can be assured of the fidelity of the interpreters and dragomans’ (‘afin qu’à 
l’avenir on puisse être assuré de la fidélité des drogmans et interprètes’; Enfants de langue 1995: 20).   
The use of the word ‘fidélité’ in the decree throws interesting light on the concept of ‘fidelity’ 
in translation history. We traditionally think of it as in terms of faithfulness’ as a criterion of accuracy: 
fidelity to the source text, or to its ‘truth’ or ‘meaning’ or some such notion. Here, clearly, we have 
fidelity with a difference, as the term now gestures towards political reliability in a context of 
competing interests. The faithful interpreter is the one who is on our side and serves our interests. The 
term was used in very much the same way another hundred years later, in a different part of the world, 
when William Jones, a high court judge in the British colonial administration in India, published his 
Grammar of the Persian Language (1771). In his preface he stressed the need for British East India 
Company officials to learn the languages of Asia because ‘it was found highly dangerous to employ the 
natives as interpreters, upon whose fidelity they could not depend’ (Niranjana 1992: 16; Jones 1969: 
xxiv). 
Having now moved from America via Turkey to India, let us migrate further east. Japan closed 
itself off from the outside world for some two hundred years, from around 1640 until the middle of the 
nineteenth century. During this period, apart from a Chinese settlement, only the Dutch were allowed a 
tiny trading post on the small artificial island of Deshima in the Bay of Nagasaki. All the interpreters 
were Japanese government officials, and their work was strictly regulated and monitored. Not only 
were the Dutch effectively prevented from learning Japanese, but virtually the entire information flow 
went in one direction only, from the foreigners to the Japanese, and not the other way round (Engels 
1998: 25ff). When as late as 1828 a German doctor at Deshima was found in possession of ‘forbidden 
items’, i.e. things he was not supposed to have access to, the Japanese interpreter who had helped him 
was severely punished. 
All these examples point to tight controls on translators and interpreters to guarantee their 
trustworthiness, to ensure that they speak exclusively with their masters’ voice, to try and close the gap 
that continually threatens to open up in translation. To the extent that translation is, in Plato’s terms, 
‘mimetic’ speech, the translator never wholly disappears behind the speech being mimicked. From the 
point of view of those who depend on translation to obtain information, that margin of visibility 
constitutes a risk. The gap that can open between original and translation may be stylistic, or religious, 
or political, or ideological, or a mixture of these. It is partly structural, the consequence of linguistic, 
cultural and historical difference. It may be the manifestation of barely conscious idiolectial 
preferences. But it also creates an opportunity for translators and interpreters to insert or at least to  
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insinuate their own agenda into the texts they are producing. To that extent the gap is a matter of voice, 
of the discursive presence and the subject position that inevitably enters translation, as it enters every 
form of speaking, from the moment  text production begins. 
We know this gap is there. Already Plato recognized that mimetic speaking, as representation, 
can approximate but remains necessarily different from that which it re presents. Today too we 
acknowledge the translator as text producer. Without the active intervention of translators we would 
not have translations in the first place. And yet, in most conventional thinking about translation we 
require translators to be, as Frances Yates had it in her comment about Florio, ‘self effacing’, to stand 
not at the original author’s side but ‘behind him’, hidden, out of view, transparent, incorporeal, 
disembodied and disenfranchised. We need translators as purveyors of otherwise inaccessible data, but 
we don’t want their intervention to leave any traces of their own, and therefore we persist in trying to 
constrain, control, regulate and ultimate to negate the translator’s labour. The ‘true interpreter’ norm, 
as Brian Harris (1990) once phrased it, requires interpreters and translators to re state the original 
exactly, without omission, addition or interference. 
It seems to me that in this anxiety, this repressed knowledge, lies one of the enduring and 
intriguing paradoxes of translation. We would like to be able to take translation for granted, to see right 
through it, make it transparent, possess and dominate it. We know we cannot. Despite this knowledge 
we keep trying to annul the tendency of translation to leave traces of the translator’s intervention and 
textual presence behind, so we may rest secure in the belief that the ‘pure’ translation’s close fit 
between itself and its original leaves no room for the translator’s separate agenda. 
The translator’s textual presence cannot be neutral, located nowhere in particular. The way a 
translation overwrites its original may be deliberate and calculated on the translator’s part but as often 
as not it is unconscious, or barely conscious, dictated by values, preferences, presuppositions and 
perceptions built into the individual and social beings that we are.  
It follows, I think, that just as the idea of a ‘pure’ translation, a translation that reproduces the 
original, the whole original and nothing but the original, is metaphysical and not of this world, the 
question of the ‘faithful’ translation is ultimately irrelevant. Faithfulness, fidelity, as we saw, is as 
much a matter of political loyalty and trustworthiness as of relations between texts. Much more 
relevant and interesting is what translation tells us about the way translators and their clients perceive 
and handle their material, and whose interests are being served, directly or indirectly. To my mind, the 
significance of translation as a cultural and historical phenomenon lies precisely in the slant, the 
presuppositions, the selectivity and the value judgements it reveals. Translation is of interest not 
despite but because of the way it prises open the ever present interstices between originals and 
translations, between donor and receptor texts. 
Let me close with two points, the first one very short, the other slightly longer. 
The first point follows immediately from what has been said so far. The historical interest in 
translation is not only that, as Florio says his old friend Giordano Bruno told him and taught publicly, 
‘from translation all science had its offspring’, or that it produces long term cultural effects, as in 
Shakespeare’s harking back to Florio’s Montaigne in The Tempest. Its significance also lies in the 
particular cultural, ideological, political and other filters of understanding and manipulation that 
translation makes visible   whether they result from calculated distortion or from inevitably prejudiced, 
localized perception. 
In other words, translation matters, historically and culturally, because it allows us to glimpse 
the self positioning of individuals and communities with regard to ‘others’. And because translation 
leaves in its wake dual texts, and often even multiple versions of original texts perceived differently 
again and again, it offers a privileged window on these various and changing self definitions. That is 
why translation does not need an apology. 
As I suggested at the beginning, I had a further reason for picking Florio as my starting point. 
In the dedication of his Montaigne, Florio gives us one of the earliest ‘gendered’ metaphors to 
characterize translation. When, using a conventional modesty topos, he speaks of his book as ‘this 
defective edition’ and adds between brackets: ‘(since all translations are reputed females, delivered at 
second hand…’, he initiates what will become a long line of metaphorical descriptions of translation in  
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terms of inferiority, subordination and matrimonial fidelity, a line which casts translation as 
•maidservant• to a patriarchal master original, ‘belle infidèle’ (translations, like women, can be either 
beautiful or faithful but not both), as the weaker, reproductive vessel compared with original writing or 
speaking, and so on. 
Metaphors like these show that translation is continually being defined and put in its place by 
means of a series of oppositions like those between strong and weak, creative and derivative, primary 
and secondary, unique and repeatable, art and craft, authority and obedience, freedom and constraint, 
speaking in one’s own name and speaking for someone else. In each instance, of course, it is 
translation which is circumscribed, subordinated, contained, controlled. 
Now, in case we should imagine that these are natural and necessary hierarchies which express 
the immutable essence of translation, we might pause to reflect that we have often construed gender 
distinctions by means of strikingly similar oppositions: creative versus reproductive, original versus 
derivative, active versus passive, dominant versus subservient, free versus confined, and so on. 
 The issue at stake here is not just a matter of the historical discourse on translation being 
sexist in that it casts translation in the role of maidservant, of doting and obedient wife, or of frivolous 
mistress. The sexist quality of much of the historical discourse on translation is beyond doubt and has 
been keenly documented in recent decades with reference to different cultural traditions. 
The point I want to make concerns the obvious parallel between the construction of gender and 
the construction of translation. Both are cultural constructions, and they involve power differentials. 
Historically, that is, translation has been defined and hemmed in by means of hierarchies strongly 
reminiscent of those employed to maintain sexual power relations. It may be worth asking whose 
interests are being served by these hierarchies, and why it is that translation apparently needs to be so 
tightly controlled and regulated. 
One reason, I suggest, may lie in what I called the anxiety of translation: the desire to ensure 
that source language speaker and translator will speak with a single voice, the master’s voice, and the 
knowledge, deep down and repressed, that the translator’s own voice can never be wholly reduced, 
subsumed, or extinguished. Mimetic speech can mimic its model, but it cannot coincide with it; the 
actor will never be the character he or she represents. That margin of difference creates an opening for 
translators to insinuate their own agenda, their own discursive voices and subject positions into texts 
which they are forbidden to claim as their own. That is what, in their different ways, we saw Florio and 
Sherlock Holmes’ Greek interpreter doing. The various examples from the history of interpreting 
illustrated the attempts on the part of those who have to rely on interpreters to reduce that differential 
margin by controlling the intepreters’ fidelity and loyalty. Most of what we call the ‘norms’ of 
translation, it seems to me, are expressions of that same anxiety. Only if translation is regulated to the 
hilt and tightly locked in hierarchies can its clients be relatively assured that it will do as it is told, a 
willing, transparent tool. The very persistence of the anxiety however suggests that it never quite gets 
on top of its object. The assurance is never more than relative. 
Allow me to round off these remarks with a minor but curious puzzle. Florio’s gendered 
metaphor of translation and his actual practice are obviously at loggerheads. By resorting to the 
gendered metaphor he presents translation as a form of mimetic speaking which is also a submissive 
and insubstantial speaking. At the same time his practice, his own verbal histrionics, his boisterous 
rhetorical and ideological rewriting and overwriting of Montaigne, shatter any idea of submissiveness. I 
will not try to resolve Florio’s contradiction. I don’t think we can explain the gendered metaphor away 
by ranging it under the preface writer’s conventional self denigration. One way of dealing with it may 
be to see it as another instance of the persistent anxiety of translation. If so, it constitutes one small case 
in a much larger series of paradoxes and puzzles that make translation endlessly intriguing, culturally 
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